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Abstract: Sustainable growth of a company requires exploration of new areas beyond its 
current businesses and technological fields. Previous studies have found that companies 
are prone to explore areas close to their core businesses and that they engage in several 
types of exploration activities. This study was designed to foster understanding of the 
corporate exploration process, a subject that has not been fully investigated to date. We 
devised a theoretical framework to analyze the exploration process and discussed its 
effectiveness in analyzing the corporate exploration process.  The activities of Fujifilm 
and Kodak, in exploration of new technologies and markets, were compared revealing 
that the fundamental cause of success or failure may be attributed to the differences in 
the exploration process.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Fujifilm and Kodak competed intensely in the photographic film business for many 
years. However, the advent of digital cameras in the 2000s markedly reduced the global 
demand for photographic film. The fates of these two companies were very different. 
After a series of twists and turns, Kodak went bankrupt in 2012. In contrast, Fujifilm 
proactively developed new businesses and is now becoming a “total healthcare company” 
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centered on medical care. 
This raises the question of what differentiated Fujifilm and Kodak. Many factors 
were involved, including their exploration strategies for new technology and new 
businesses. Having competed in the same business for many years, Fujifilm and Kodak 
had similar core technologies. For example, the two companies’ top five technical fields 
of cumulative patent applications between 1983 and 2012 were the same: optics, 
audio-visual, textile machines, basic materials, and computers. Moreover, the changes 
in ratios of applications in these five fields followed almost identical patterns, as 
described later. Thus, these two companies adopted similar patent application 
behaviors in these fields and retained similar core technologies.  
Nonetheless, the two companies followed separate growth trajectories, which 
eventually led to different business outcomes. Thus, even if companies have the same 
capacity at one point and compete in the same market environment, their subsequent 
exploration strategies will influence their success or failure.  
Both companies understood that digital technology would soon be the predominant 
type of photography business, having begun investing in exploration on digital cameras 
from as early as the 1980’s. This indicates that the factor that determined the success or 
failure of Fujifilm and Kodak was not their responses to the emerging digital camera 
market itself, but whether they had a consistent, long-term exploration strategy in 
response to the declining trends of their core film business. Thus, the fundamental 
question is the factors that ultimately resulted in one company having a consistent 
exploration strategy and the other having an inconsistent strategy. This study found 
that this difference arose from the different methods by which the two companies  
proceeded with exploration. 
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Put simply, Fujifilm adopted a middle-up-down process of exploration, in which  
top management sets the vision of the organization, and middle managers grasp and 
solve the gap between the vision set by top management and current conditions by 
facilitating team-level dialectic interactions among employees (Nonaka,1988; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995). In this organizational process, exploration activity proceeds down 
the exploration hierarchy and narrows the area of exploration organizationally. By 
contrast, Kodak tended to determine its area of exploration through a top–down 
approach, with a CEO often recruited from the outside, thereby omitting the 
organizational process. The CEO’s business background and past achievements may 
have influenced the selection of areas of exploration (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). We 
show differences in these exploration processes through an in-depth case study of 
Fujifilm and Kodak.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the framework 
of examining exploration processes while reviewing related studies. Section three 
explains our methods and data. Section four presents a comparative analysis of the 
exploration processes adopted by Fujifilm and Kodak. Using patent data, we 
demonstrate that, while Fujifilm’s exploration process was consistent, Kodak’s was not. 
Section five discusses the causes of these differences from the perspective of corporate 
exploration and examines the validity and effectiveness of the framework. Finally, 
section six concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations on corporate exploration for new technologies and 
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markets 
 
2.1.  Uncertain nature of exploration  
 
Studies have demonstrated that a company’s search activity shows a path dependency 
that makes their exploration activities lean toward areas close to those of their core 
technology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Studies of the relationship between 
organizational competency and exploration of closely related areas have shown that 
companies form structured internal organizational routines to increase efficiency (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982) and end up focusing on activities associated 
with closely related areas, limiting their exploration to certain areas. Absorptive 
capacity depends on an organization’s degree of preliminary knowledge; that is, it is 
closely related to the knowledge accumulated through past research and development 
activities (Cohen and Levinthal, ibid.). Thus, a company that has succeeded with 
existing technologies lacks the capacity to absorb new technologies. Therefore, the 
exploration and learning activities of successful companies have a path dependency, in 
that they are naturally biased toward closely related technologies and knowledge they 
have already accumulated (Helfat, 1994; Stuart and Podolny, 1996). As a result, the 
products released by companies that build on past achievements tend to be more similar 
to their existing products than products released by start-up companies (Martin and 
Mitchell, 1998).  
   Companies foster innovation by technically exploring new areas different from those 
of their core technologies (Bergelman, 1991, 1994). Exploration activities in closely 
related areas are considered positive, as they can strengthen and refine a company’s 
 5 
accumulated core technologies and competencies. However, companies may become 
more attached to their accumulated competencies, despite changes in the external 
environment that have given rise to the requirement for new technologies. Core 
technologies may inhibit a flexible response to changes in the external environment and 
ultimately bring about rigidities. Companies in this situation are said to have fallen 
into “competency rigidity” or a “competency trap” (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levitt and 
March, 1988). Therefore, companies must broaden their exploration activity and avoid 
sticking to closely related technologies. However, wide exploration that expands beyond 
closely related areas involve costs and uncertainties. Uncertainties in activities 
involving technological innovations are driven by the exploration activity itself (Fleming, 
2001).  
Studies have proposed frameworks to effectively consider uncertainties caused by 
exploration activities. One such framework involves exploration depth and exploration 
scope (Katila and Ahuja, 2002). Exploration depth refers to the frequency at which an 
accumulated knowledge is used, and exploration scope reflects the degree to which new 
knowledge is searched. Excessively wide or deep explorations are counterproductive to 
product development, whereas explorations with a certain degree of both scope and 
depth are the most effective for product development (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  
Previous studies have attempted to classify exploration scope, depending on 
whether an exploration crosses certain technological and organizational boundaries 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Crossing a technological boundary to integrate 
technologies in different technical areas and crossing an organizational boundary to 
cooperate with different organizations require different skills, know-how, and 
knowledge. Therefore, analyses of exploration activity should distinguish between 
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technology and organization. Using a two-dimensional matrix, exploration activity can 
be classified into four types (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). For example, exploration 
beyond both technological and organizational boundaries and explorations of 
technologies within an organization but in a technical area different from its core 
technologies constitute different types of exploration and require different skills and 
know-how.  
Research on technological progress has analyzed exploration activities to enhance 
understanding of the nature of technical advances (Nelson and Winter,1982; 
Rosenberg,1969). In some cases, marginal improvements in existing technologies 
involve exploring in several different directions, whereas, in other cases, a few 
directions may seem much more worthy of attention than others. Particularly in 
industries characterized by very rapid technological advances, the succession of 
advances may appear almost inevitable. These promising trajectories and directions for 
exploring technological progress have been termed “natural trajectories” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). The concept of “technological imperatives” has similar meanings in 
guiding the evolution of certain technologies (Rosenberg, 1969). These concepts indicate 
that, in some cases, search activities for technical advances may follow particular 
trajectories that appear almost inevitable.  
Thus previous research has studied exploration activity from different perspectives 
and determined the effect of each type of exploration. However, because these studies 
did not consider the exploration process itself, this study proposes an analytical 
framework for exploration processes to understand how the exploration process 
proceeds in different business contexts.  
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2.2. Framework of the exploration process 
 
Since this paper addresses the process of by which corporate exploration proceeds, we 
will consider how this process proceeds within a company. An exploration is an 
experimental and trial-and-error process that leads to the acquisition of new knowledge 
and learning (March, 1991). To acquire knowledge from exploration, it is necessary to 
clearly delineate the explored area, or boundaries of exploration, regardless of the 
technology or market. Therefore, it is first necessary to determine the scope of the area, 
because it defines the basic direction of the exploration activity (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002). 
Several steps are involved in the exploration process. First, it is necessary to 
broadly examine candidates for exploration and define the scope of the area of 
exploration. Second, from among these multiple alternatives, it is necessary to 
determine the direction to explore further. We call the former “wide exploration” and the 
latter “local exploration.”  These are connected by a focusing process, which uses 
focusing devices to determine the direction of local exploration (Rosenberg, 1976). For 
example, during wide exploration, Fujifilm assessed multiple business areas and then 
chose healthcare within certain scope. Of the possible choices within healthcare, 
including pharmaceutical products and medical care equipment, Fujifilm focused on 
cosmetics and performed a local exploration of that area. Narrowing from multiple 
choices within healthcare to cosmetics is an example of the focusing process, resulting 
in a direction of local exploration. At this stage, the company can perform a local 
exploration of cosmetics-related areas to generate useful knowledge. 
 Thus, the process of exploration can be conceptualized as going from upper to 
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lower levels within a hierarchy (Clark, 1985; Simon, 1981). It consists of repeating the 
focusing process that defines the direction (Rosenberg, 1976) and the exploration 
activity.  The hierarchy of exploration incorporates the two dimensions of depth and 
scope of exploration, both of which have proven in analyzing exploration (Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002). In this sense, the concept of hierarchy of exploration is consistent with 
existing findings. Figure 1 shows the hierarchical nature of exploration activity, using 
the example of Fujifilm. 
 
Based on understanding of its hierarchical nature (Clark, 1985; Simon, 1981), the 
exploration process can be analyzed from two different perspectives; that is, a method of 
moving within a hierarchy and a method of focusing (Figure 2). There are two types of 
movement within a hierarchy: from upper to lower levels, thereby narrowing the area of 
exploration; and determining the area of local exploration directly, without going 
through the wide exploration and focusing processes. There are also two types of 
focusing, organizational focusing, which encourages front line managers to engage in 
Fig. 1. Exploration Hierarchy
Exploration 
Strategy
Healthcare
Cosmetics
High-performance
Materials Optical Devices
Pharmaceutical 
Products
Medical Care 
Equipment
Wide exploration layer
Local exploration layer
Width
Liquid Crystal 
Film
Focusing process
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the focusing process for areas of local exploration; and non-organizational focusing, 
which does not involve organization-wide discussions of areas of local exploration. Thus, 
the exploration process can be regarded as a matrix of four quadrants.  
In the case of an exploration process located in the upper right quadrant, the 
exploration area will be narrowed within a hierarchy through an organizational 
focusing process. A typical example is a middle-up-down model of knowledge creation 
(Nonaka,1988; Nonaka and Takeuchi,1995), whereby senior management determine the 
destination of an organization, and middle managers choose the route and steer the ship 
by facilitating team-level interactions among employees (Nonaka,1988; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi,1995). According to this model, both top managers and front line managers 
are engaged in discussions to set the direction of exploration. Focusing and exploration 
activities within the organization are repeated while proceeding from upper to lower 
levels within the exploration hierarchy. Once the area of wide exploration is determined 
by interactions within the organization, subsequent local explorations proceed within 
that range. In this sense, this type of exploration process has the advantage of stability 
of the direction of exploration.  
In contrast, when the exploration process is located in the lower left quadrant, the 
area of local exploration is determined directly, without organizational processing from 
the outset. There are two typical cases. First, when a company faces a natural trajectory 
of technical change emerging in a neighboring industry, the company can easily identify 
areas of exploration and does not require a focusing process. In tandem with the rise of 
digital technology, the necessity of exploring digital cameras became self-evident and 
inevitable for traditional camera manufacturers. The second case is when top 
management plays a pivotal role in managerial cognitive capabilities (Helfat and 
 10 
Peteraf, 2015, Helfat, 2007) and decides the area of exploration in a top down manner 
(O'Reilly and Tushman,2016). Top management often begins new projects to which they 
are personally attached through top down decision making. Both of these cases have the 
merit of speedy decision making because they omit the focusing process within the 
organization. However, in the latter case, there is a risk that the area of exploration 
may change every time top management is replaced, because the areas of exploration 
were determined in the absence of an organizational focusing mechanism. This is very 
close to the loss of exploration direction.  
 
Based on this framework, we found that Fujifilm and Kodak followed completely 
different exploration processes. This difference affected their fates, as described below.  
3. Method and Data 
 
This study has exploratory aspects, including the extraction of details about the 
personnel and organizations involved in corporate innovation activities, the gathering of 
From wide 
to local area
Direct to local 
area
Method of  focusing  
OrganizationalNon organizational 
Method of moving within 
the exploration hierarchy
Fig. 2.  Framework of Analyzing the Exploration Process  
Fujifilm (second phase)
Kodak
(second phase)
 11 
data regarding the processes associated with these activities, and the analysis of these 
data. The methodology of this study included a qualitative survey and case study 
analysis. This research methodology gathers and analyzes abundant data, while 
introducing a new theoretical framework not previously described (e.g., Eisenhardt, 
1989; Pettgrew, 1990; Yin, 1994). 
The analysis of Fujifilm was based on semi-structured interviews with executives of 
Fujifilm, internal information provided by the company, data prepared by the company 
for the general public, and publicly available materials, including books and business 
magazines. The analysis of Kodak is based on publicly available materials, including 
books, business magazines, and academic papers. Data on patents filed by both 
companies were also analyzed. 
Semi-structured interviews with seven individuals, two company executive 
directors and five directors of related departments, were conducted on July 17, 2015, 
January 29, 2016, and July 14, 2016. Before the interviews, we developed a profile of 
the company based on public sources. The goal of the interviews was to understand 
Fujifilm’s exploration strategy. To obtain a more complete picture of the company, we 
also spoke with staff in related functional areas. Each interview lasted over one hour, 
and some individuals were interviewed multiple times. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed by a professional service. When clarification was necessary, interviews 
were followed up by email. A report was prepared based on the information from the 
interviews and written sources, with the completed report reviewed by Fujifilm to ensure the 
validity of the facts cited. We also communicated by email with Fujifilm to clarify several 
questions, resulting in a complete version of the corporate transformation process. 
We also analyzed the nature of exploration using patent data (Dutta and Weiss, 
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1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Patents contain 
extensive information about the inventor, the company to which the patent is assigned, 
and the technological antecedents of the invention, which can be accessed in 
computerized form. Every patent is assigned to a technical class, which we used to 
identify the technical areas being developed by the company.  
Technical
area
Cumulative
number
Rank Share
Accumulated 
share
Optics 109326 1 30.4% 30.4%
Audio-visual 47790 2 13.3% 43.7%
Textile 
machines
36806 3 10.2% 53.9%
Basic 
materials
19099 4 5.3% 59.2%
Computer 17007 5 4.7% 63.9%
Semicon 15800 6 4.4% 68.3%
Macromolecul
ar
14465 7 4.0% 72.3%
Other 
machines
13453 8 3.7% 76.1%
Surface tech 12356 9 3.4% 79.5%
Medical tech 10837 10 3.0% 82.5%
Measurement 9826 11 2.7% 85.3%
Organic chem 8973 12 2.5% 87.8%
Elec_mach 8678 13 2.4% 90.2%
Table 1. Cumulative Numbers of Fujifilm Patent Applications 
in Technical Areas Ranked 1 to 13 (1982 to 2012)
Technical areas ranked 
1 to 5 represent the 
core areas of Fujifilm. 
About 2/3 of patent 
applications during 
this period were in 
technical areas 1 to 5. 
Technical areas ranked 6 to
13 represent peripheral 
technical areas of Fujifilm.
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The cumulative number of patent applications by Fujifilm between 1982 and 2012 
in technical areas ranked 1 to 13 accounted for more than 90% of all patent applications 
by Fujifilm during this period (see Table 1). About two-thirds of these applications were 
in technical areas 1 to 5, which we regarded as the core technical areas of Fujifilm. 
Accordingly, technical areas 6 to 13 can be regarded as peripheral technical areas. 
Similarly, we counted the patent applications by Kodak and identified their core and 
peripheral technical areas in the same manner (see Table 2). Because the cumulative 
number does not represent the ranking of applications at any specific time, we 
determined the changes over time in ratios of patent applications in the top five fields of 
Kodak and Fujifilm (Figures 3 and 4). Both companies applied for patents in the same 
top five technical fields: optics, audio-visual, textile machines, basic materials, and 
computers. Also their ratios followed almost the same patterns. 
Table 2. Cumulative numbers of Kodak Patent Applications in 
Technical Areas Ranked 1 to 13 (1982 to 2012)
Technical areas ranked 
1 to 5 represent the 
core areas of Kodak. 
About 2/3 of patent 
applications during 
this period were in 
technical areas 1 to 5. 
Technical areas ranked 6 to
13 represent peripheral 
technical areas of Kodak.
Technical
area
Cumulative
number
rank share
Accumulated 
Share
Optics 36203 1 31.2% 31.2%
Textile 
machines
14226 2 12.3% 43.4%
Audio-visual 13419 3 11.6% 55.0%
Computer 7883 4 6.8% 61.8%
Basic 
materials
4727 5 4.1% 65.9%
Macromolecul
ar
4264 6 3.7% 69.5%
Organic chem 4123 7 3.6% 73.1%
Semicon 3910 8 3.4% 76.4%
Measurement 3837 9 3.3% 79.7%
Handling 3110 10 2.7% 82.4%
Elec_mach 2984 11 2.6% 85.0%
Surface tech 2935 12 2.5% 87.5%
Chemical eng 2405 13 2.1% 89.6%
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4. Comparative Study of the Exploration Strategies of Fujifilm and Kodak 1 
 
Analysis of the competition between Fujifilm and Kodak in the photographic film 
                                                  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
KODAK
Textile machines
Basic materials
Optics
Computer
Audio-visual
Fig. 3. Kodak’s Patent Application Ratio Trends in Its Top Five Fields
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
FUJIFILM
Textile machines
Basic materials
Optics
Computer
Audio-visual
Fig. 4. Fujifilm’s Patent Application Ratio Trends in Its Top Five Fields
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market from the 1980s to 2010s can separate their exploration strategies into two 
phases. The first phase, which ended around 2000, was the period during which core 
technologies incorporated into digital cameras were explored and commercialized. 
During this period, the main areas of exploration were evident and inevitable, as the 
technology driven natural trajectory clearly set the direction and pace of technical 
change (Nelson and Winter, 1982). During the second phase, when it became clear that 
the digital camera business could not make up for the extinction of the photographic 
film business, the survival of the two companies required exploration. Because new 
business areas were unclear, their choice of areas of exploration became strategically 
very important.  
 
4.1. The first phase: Exploration and commercialization of digital cameras 
 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, signs of the advent of digital technology began to appear. 
Because both Fujifilm and Kodak understood that digital technology could threaten 
their photographic film business, they began exploring related technologies at an early 
stage. First, Fujifilm started a digital camera project at its Central Research Institute 
in 1977 and established a microelectronics laboratory in 1981 to develop the company’s 
in-house charged coupled device (CCD), a type of semiconductor. Kodak showed similar 
trends. In 1975, Steve Sasson of Kodak invented the world’s first digital camera (Lucas 
and Goh, 2009). Because the number of pixels was as small as 10,000, the image quality 
was poor, and these cameras could not be used as a substitute for film cameras. By 1993, 
Kodak had invested 5 billion dollars in research and development for digital technology 
(Lucas and Goh, 2009).  
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The progress of technological exploration can also be traced by reviewing these 
companies’ related patent applications. The trends of applications for semiconductor 
patents by Fujifilm and Kodak (Figure 5) show that both companies engaged in 
exploration of this field beginning around 1985. Between 1989 and 1993, Kodak applied 
for more patents than Fujifilm, a sign that Kodak proactively engaged in exploration of 
digital technology. After a relatively stable period, the number of patent applications by 
Fujifilm rapidly increased, beginning around 1997. 
 
Historically, the first sign that the digital camera market would start to grow 
emerged in 1995, when Casio released its QV-10 model, with an image quality standard 
of one million pixels. This image quality standard could replace film cameras, resulting 
in market expansion. In 2000, Fujifilm’s digital camera (Fine Pix4700Z), equipped with 
its own Super CCD Honeycomb, accounted for 23% of the global market share and 28% 
of the domestic market share. Its success was largely due to the Super CCD Honeycomb, 
which enabled the camera to capture 60% more light per square inch. In April 2001, 
Fig. 5. Semiconductor-related Patent Application Trends for Fujifilm and Kodak
Data from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. The number of annual patent applications 
related to semiconductors (IPC:H01L) was aggregated based on WIPO’s IPC and Technology 
Concordance Table.
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Kodak introduced its digital camera EasyShare to the market. It featured the 
convenience of easy download of pictures to a computer, as well as a longer battery life 
than that of competing products. Less than two years later, Kodak owned the top share 
of the American digital camera market (Christensen, 2006), with the two companies 
accounting for a large share of the worldwide digital camera market in 2000 (Figure 6).  
 
Overall, both companies were aware of the necessity of digital camera development 
at an early stage, both engaged in technology exploration not long after. However, their 
subsequent exploration trajectory differed markedly. While Fujifilm engaged in 
consistent exploration of digital camera technology for about 20 years, the new CEO of 
Kodak, George Fisher, who had been recruited from Motorola, decided to return to the 
company’s core business of photographic film with investments in emerging markets. In 
2000, however, George Fisher was replaced by Daniel Carp, who once again accelerated 
the development of digital cameras. After a period of twists and turns, Kodak ultimately 
returned to digital camera development. It turned out that both company had a large 
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Fig. 6. Global Market Share Trends for Digital Cameras
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market share by around 2000. 
 
4.2. The second phase; Exploration in the post-digital camera era 
 Many companies from other industries entered the digital camera market, making it 
highly competitive. For example, Canon entered the market in 1999, followed by 
Matsushita Electric Under such severe market conditions, Fujifilm’s market share 
gradually decreased, reaching 10% in 2004. Kodak’s share followed the same trajectory. 
After the commoditization and falling profitability of the digital camera, Antonio Perez, 
who had been appointed Kodak CEO in 2005, called it a “crappy business”. To make up 
for the extinction of film market, the exploration of new businesses was deemed urgent 
by both two companies. Decisions about which technological and business areas would 
be explored eventually resulted in different outcome for Fujifilm and Kodak. 
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Corporate exploration beyond core technologies can be assessed by examining 
patent applications for peripheral technologies. The companies showed basically the 
same patent application patterns in their five top-ranked five fields. However, 
(cumulative) patent applications from 1983 to 2012 in technical fields ranked between 6 
and 13 showed different trends for Kodak (Figure 7) and Fujifilm (Figure 8). Fields 
ranked 6–13 were chosen because these applications appeared to represent exploration 
beyond the boundaries of core technologies.  
The number of patent applications by Kodak showed two peaks. The first and 
higher peak, occurring around 1989 and 1990, consisted of applications in organic 
chemistry, macromolecules, and methods of measurement, whereas the second peak, 
between 2002 and 2004, consisted of applications in semiconductors and surface 
technology. The technical fields of these two peaks differed, indicating a lack of 
consistency in Kodak's technical exploration. 
In contrast, patent applications by Fujifilm showed an upward trend in almost all 
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technical fields, beginning in 1998. Since that time, Fujifilm has been involved in 
consistent technological exploration in the fields that include both its core technologies 
and peripheral technologies. Whereas Kodak’s exploration lost direction, Fujifilm’s 
technology exploration beyond core technologies showed long-term consistency. 
Corporate exploration can also be analyzed by determining how much it crosses 
organizational boundaries (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001), for example by examining 
these firms’ joint R&D activities with external organizations. Cooperative patent 
applications filed together with external organizations increased for both companies, 
beginning around 2002 (Figure 9). The growth in the number of such applications filed 
by Fujifilm was especially remarkable, indicating the company’s attempts to cross its 
organizational boundaries and proactively explore external technologies.  
 
The trends in diversification and concentration for explorations by both companies 
can also be assessed using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index HHI), which measures the 
distribution of patent applications. A higher HHI indicates a higher concentration level, 
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whereas a lower HHI indicates greater diversity. Figure 10 shows the trends in HHIs 
for the top 13 technical fields of Fujifilm and Kodak. The technological endeavors of 
Fujifilm remained concentrated throughout the 1980s, peaking in 1991 and 1992, but 
showing consistently greater diversification of technological development from 1990 
onward. The progress of diversification slowed around 2009, becoming steady in recent 
years. In comparison, Kodak started diversifying its technological endeavors in the 
early 1980s but showed increased concentration in the early 1990’. During the first half 
of the 2000s, Kodak showed greater diversification of technology development but again 
began increased concentration in 2005.  
 
Thus, from the 1980s to the 1990s, Fujifilm showed concentrated technological 
development in the optical field, eventually catching up with Kodak. Beginning in the 
1990s, however, Fujifilm showed consistent technological exploration and promoted the 
diversification of its businesses. In contrast, beginning in the 1980s, Kodak prepared for 
the advent of digital technology by investing in technological exploration of 
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Fig. 10. Trends in HHI Indices for Fujifilm and Kodak
HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
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pharmaceutical products and medical care equipment. In the early 1990s, however, 
Kodak started to rapidly concentrate its technological development. During the second 
half of the 1990s, when digital cameras became a threat to the company’s main business 
of photographic film, it once again started technological exploration in a variety of fields. 
In 2005, however, Kodak started concentrating its technological resources on the inkjet 
and printer businesses. These transformations once again demonstrate the contrast 
between the strategies employed by Fujifilm and Kodak.  
 
4.3. Exploration of medical care products 
This section will describe the technical exploration of both companies in the medical 
care field, focusing on two sub-fields: medical care equipment and pharmaceutical 
products. We will consider when Fujifilm began its exploration in the field, and how 
Kodak explored this area.  
Figure 11 shows the trends in the number of patent applications for medical care 
equipment by both companies. These patents ranked tenth and thirteenth among the 
cumulative number of patent applications by Fujifilm and Kodak, respectively. Figure 
10 shows that Fujifilm has explored technology in this field for a long time.2 Beginning 
in 2002, Fujifilm showed a marked increase in the number of patent applications and 
increased exploration of this technology. Kodak started exploring this field a few years 
after Fujifilm. Between 1990 and 1995, Kodak and Fujifilm filed similar numbers of 
patent applications in this field, but the number filed by Kodak markedly decreased 
thereafter. 
                                                  
2  Fujifilm started to develop FCR (Fuji Computed Radiography), its digital X-ray image 
diagnostic system, in 1974 and released it in 1983. This was an alternative to the traditional 
analog method using X-ray film. 
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The same trends can be observed in the number of patents filed for pharmaceutical 
products. As shown in Figure 12, Kodak began to explore pharmaceutical technology 
earlier than Fujifilm and started filing patent applications in 1986. Beginning in 1996, 
however, Kodak withdrew from its exploration of pharmaceutical technology, and 
decreased the number of patent applications filed. In contrast, Fujifilm started to file 
increased numbers of patent applications a little later than Kodak, around 1990. 
Beginning in 2002, the number of applications surged, after a stable application period 
of over 10 years. 
These findings indicate that both Kodak and Fujifilm started to explore similar 
technological areas at roughly the same time, but that subsequent development was 
completely different. While Fujifilm increased medical care exploration in the 2000s and 
began to shift the focus of its business to this field, Kodak withdrew from it.  
Not surprisingly, the merger and acquisition strategy is consistent with the above 
technical exploration. In 1988, Kodak purchased the pharmaceutical company Sterling 
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Drug for 5.1 billion dollars but sold it in 1994. In 2007, it finally sold its medical care 
equipment business and completely withdrew from the medical care field. Meanwhile, 
Fujifilm purchased Toyama Chemical in 2008 and made it a consolidated subsidiary. 
This was followed by its purchase in 2012 of SonoSite, a large American manufacturer 
of portable ultrasound devices. Through these acquisitions, Fujifilm injected more 
management resources into its medical care business.  
 
5. Differences between the Exploration Processes of Fujifilm and Kodak 
 
The core technologies of Fujifilm and Kodak were almost identical, and both faced the 
same market environment, especially regarding the advent of digital technology. Thus, 
had both companies assessed their own core technologies and looked for new areas to 
which they could be applied, they would have explored the same technological and 
business areas. In fact, between the 1980s and 1990s, the two companies were exploring 
the same areas, such as medical care equipment and pharmaceutical products.  
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A statement by Fujifilm CEO Shigetaka Komori confirms this: “Naturally, Kodak 
had also foreseen the arrival of the digital era and was cautious about it. With regards 
to diversification, they took steps similar to Fujifilm when they set out to develop 
pharmaceuticals.” 3  Although Fujifilm and Kodak initially followed the same 
exploration strategy, these strategies ultimately took entirely different trajectories, 
resulting in completely different business performances.  
 
5.1. Fujifilm’s exploration process  
 
Before its top management officially decided on which new business areas to explore, 
Fujifilm had been exploring new technological fields independently at the operational 
level. For example, in 1987 when the digital camera was being developed by its 
electronic image department, a group of middle managers who were interested in the 
company’s future spontaneously started a series of “technology strategy meetings” 
(Kuwashima, 2009). These meetings were attended by 10 members selected from 
various departments, such as R&D, manufacturing, and human resources departments. 
This group, which met regularly once every month, took the lead in discussing possible 
future technological and business directions of the company and submitted a final report to 
the senior management (Shibata, Kodama, and Suzuki, 2017). Thus, in the late 1980s, 
managers at the operational level were already engaged in discussions on the future 
business directions of the company.  
 
Later, in 2000, Fujifilm officially started a company level "wide exploration", under 
                                                  
3 Shigetaka Komori, “Spirit of Management.” 
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the leadership of CEO Komori and involving the technology development department. 
As part of this initiative, the company conducted a 2-year “technology inventory” project, 
which examined which new businesses to explore, based on technology and market. For 
this purpose, Fujifilm constructed a four-quadrant map, with current and new 
technologies on the horizontal axis and current and future markets on the vertical axis. 
Then, the top management determined the future direction of the organization: Komori 
was quoted as saying that “without identifying which fields we can take advantage of 
with our own technological and management resources, we will not be able to put our 
business on track. For that, first, we need to organize and verify what kinds of strengths 
Fujifilm has.”4  
As a result, it was decided that the company would invest in six strategically 
articulated fields: healthcare, high-performance materials, graphics, optical devices, 
digital imaging, and documents (Fujifilm Holdings Corporation, 2016). In terms of 
hierarchy of exploration, this process can be identified as deciding the areas of "wide 
exploration". Healthcare and high-performance materials are widely defined categories 
that do not refer to specific products. Because healthcare has a very broad range, 
making it difficult to engage in the experimental or trial-and-error processes that could 
lead to knowledge acquisition and learning. Fujifilm needed to be more specific about 
this new area. After examining many options, Fujifilm decided to explore the field of 
functional cosmetics as local exploration area.5  
In selecting functional cosmetics, the technological synergy and business timelines 
of the company worked as organizational focusing devices to define the direction of 
                                                  
4 Shigetaka Komori, “Spirit of Management.”  
5 The exploration and entry process for the cosmetics business is similar to that cited by Shibata, 
Kodama, and Suzuki (2017).  
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exploration (Rosenberg, 1976). The term technological synergy indicates the application 
to cosmetics of basic technologies accumulated in the film business, such as antioxidant 
and collagen control technologies (Shibata, Kodama, and Suzuki, 2017; Kodama and 
Shibata, 2016). Despite not having a sales channel to the cosmetics market, Fujifilm 
emphasized the merits stemming from technological synergy. The other perspective was 
the timeline for product commercialization. Cosmetics can be commercialized more 
quickly than pharmaceutical products, and can also be evaluated in the market 
relatively quickly. Because the company was already in the very time-consuming 
business of pharmaceutical products, that balance of the timeline was also considered.  
Yuzo Toda (vice-president and CTO as of 2016), who spearheaded this initiative at 
that time, said the following: 
Balance is important in business. If we invest solely in businesses with 
long-term goals, we run the risk of interrupting them as soon as the managers 
are replaced. Therefore, to get to know the market better, we decided to invest in 
cosmetics, a field that not only requires less development time than 
pharmaceutical products, but is also where we could achieve our goals relatively 
quickly.6 
Similarly, the following statement by Naoto Yanagihara (General Manager of R&D 
Headquarters, Executive Officer as of 2016) also indicates that Fujifilm uses a business 
timeline as one of its evaluation criteria: “[Regarding photographic film-related 
technology], we have been keeping the areas and core technologies we believe will grow 
in the mid-to-long term, even if they are not commercially profitable in the short-term.”7 
                                                  
6 Toda (2015) Forbes Japan, March 26, 2015. 
7 “Nikkei no Monozukuri,” March 2016. 
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Hence, the use by Fujifilm of technological synergy and business timeline as 
organizational focusing devices to define its direction of exploration led the company to 
focus on the functional cosmetics business as a new business area (Rosenberg, 1976).  
   
5.2. Kodak’s exploration process  
Conversely, Kodak’s exploration process was conducted in a top–down manner by 
the initiative of CEO, generally omitting the organizational focusing process. Figure 13 
provides a chronological representation of the appointment of Kodak’s CEOs and its 
exploration strategy. Basically, Kodak was aiming to shift from photographic film to 
digital cameras by promoting slogans such as “We are a digital company” and “We want 
to be a digital company.”8 In 1993, Kodak’s board of directors invited George Fisher 
from Motorola to become CEO, an unprecedented step for Kodak, as no previous CEO 
had come from outside the company. Fisher’s goal was to strengthen the company’s 
main business of photography through digital technology. Therefore, in 1994, Kodak 
sold the pharmaceutical company Sterling Drug, which it had purchased in 1988, to 
Bayer and  invested those resources in film photography in China and other emerging 
markets (Lucas and Goh, 2009). Although Kodak had conducted research and 
development on digital cameras from an early stage and tried to diversify its business 
by investing in pharmaceutical products, it ended up re-investing in the photographic 
film business. Its patent applications in the digital camera field began to increase 
markedly around 2001, 3–4 four years later than Fujifilm. This delay appears to have 
been caused by George Fisher, who decided to return to the company’s main business of 
photographic film.  
                                                  
8 Shigetaka Komori “Spirit of Management” 
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In 2000, George Fisher was replaced by Daniel Carp, who once again accelerated 
the development of digital cameras. This change is reflected in the rapid increase, 
beginning in 2001, in the number of patent applications for semiconductors. In April 
2001, Kodak introduced its first digital camera, EasyShare, to the market and secured 
the largest share in the American market (Christensen, 2006). Its CEO announced the 
company’s commitment to digital technology, not only to photographic cameras but to 
medical care. The 2003 annual report stated that the company had “implemented a 
digital oriented strategy to support revenue and sustainable earnings”, and its 2004 
report stated that, “in the first full year of its digital transformation strategy, Kodak 
came out of the gate at a full gallop and we continue to build momentum” (Lucas and 
Goh, 2009).  
In 2005, however, the Kodak board of directors invited Antonio Perez from 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) to become CEO. Perez, who called the digital camera business 
“crappy,” sold the medical care equipment business in 2007 and sought to enter the 
inkjet printer business. Once again, the area of exploration had changed. Sales of Kodak 
inkjet printers began in 2007, but, by 2011, HP, Canon, and Seiko Epson accounted for 
around 90% of the global printer market, making it impossible for Kodak to increase its 
share. In 2012, Kodak declared bankruptcy.  
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These findings indicate that Kodak’s exploration strategy was executed in a top–
down manner. The CEO, sometimes recruited from outside the company, defined the 
area of exploration without an organizational focusing process. This type of exploration 
process is prone to changing direction because it is dependent on the judgment of the 
CEO. Two factors influence the judgment of a CEO: those attributable to corporate 
governance, such as demands from investors; and the CEO’s professional experience, 
such as background and past achievements. 
For example, Fisher’s return to the photographic film business was due in part to 
the influence of investors seeking short-term results. Fujifilm CEO Komori shares his 
point of view: “In the United States, investors always demand short-term results from 
the managers. As I said before, even though Kodak tried to diversify its business for a 
while, maybe that kind of influence led them to return to photography, a field where it is 
easier to secure some kind of profit.”9 
                                                  
9 “Editor-in-chief ’s interview,” Nikkei Business, July 23, 2012. 
Fig. 13. Relationship Between Appointment of Kodak CEOs and 
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However, the reason Antonio Perez shifted Kodak to the inkjet printer business was 
likely due to his previous professional experience. As vice-president of HP, Perez was 
responsible for managing its inkjet printer business. During that time, he increased the 
number of printers sold worldwide from 17 million to 100 million and increased sales to 
over 10 billion dollars, an achievement that paved the way to his becoming Kodak CEO. 
Thus, Kodak’s shift to the inkjet printer business may have been due to its new CEO’s 
successful experiences, resulting in a strong motivation to try unique strategies. Thus, 
both investors seeking short-term results and previous experiences, such as the 
business background of a CEO, may affect the selection of areas of exploration. 
These findings are supported by studies showing that the judgment of CEOs is 
influenced by their cognitive capabilities, such as how they think about the business. A 
CEO’s cognitive capabilities may, in turn, influence the success or failure of a business. 
For example, the difficulty faced by NCR while entering the field of mainframe 
computers was attributed to the cognitive capabilities of the managers and how they 
perceived NCR’s business (Rosenbloom, 2000). Moreover, CEOs’ cognitive capabilities 
have been found to be unconsciously affected by their past business experiences and 
accumulated knowledge (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015). Because CEOs’ past business 
experiences implicitly influence their judgment, areas of exploration are likely to 
change whenever a CEO with different business experiences is recruited from outside 
the company.  
 
6. Conclusions 
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This study focused on the exploration process, a subject insufficiently covered in 
previous studies. To better understand this process, we presented a two-dimensional 
framework to understand the exploration process. Our analysis of the exploration 
strategies of Fujifilm and Kodak during their corporate transformation processes 
showed the validity of this framework. In this section, we will summarize our findings 
and present our conclusions. 
It is widely believed that Kodak’s bankruptcy was caused by its failure to properly 
deal with the emergence of the digital camera market. However, as Section 4 indicates, 
Fujifilm and Kodak were not very dissimilar in their business commitments to this  
market. Although their market shares gradually decreased, both initially had large 
market shares. Kodak introduced its first digital camera EasyShare before the market 
started to grow and had the largest share of the American market in the early 2000s. 
Therefore, Kodak did not fail due to its inability to transition from film to digital 
cameras. Rather, it failed because of its subsequent exploration strategy, which changed 
direction repeatedly. 
This does not mean, however, that Kodak was late in starting to explore for new 
businesses. The timing of Kodak’s explorations in medical care equipment and 
pharmaceutical products was comparable to that of Fujifilm. However, Kodak’s changes 
in the direction of exploration ultimately pushed the company to bankruptcy. The 
comparative study in this paper explains why Kodak’s exploration lost direction, with 
our findings indicating that the company’s manner of managing the exploration process 
basically caused the company to fail.  
During the first phase of exploration into digital cameras, the necessity of this 
exploration was obvious and inevitable, because the direction and pace of technical 
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change were predominantly directed by their natural trajectory (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Guided by constraints, Fujifilm and Kodak were similar in introducing related 
technology into their products, making a focusing process generally unnecessary. Kodak 
was able to return to digital camera development even after having gone back once to its 
traditional film photography business. These facts indicate that natural trajectory and 
its effect on the direction of exploration cannot be ignored. 
During the second phase of exploration, after the introduction of digital cameras, 
the need to diversify required many alternative directions of exploration. This second 
phase required more difficult decisions than the first phase. Due to differences in their 
exploration processes, the fate of the two companies diverged during the second phase. 
Fujifilm started with a wide exploration process, narrowing to a local exploration 
process within an exploration hierarchy, enabling Fujifilm to organizationally define the 
area of exploration through an organizational focusing process. Thus, Fujifilm’s 
exploration process can be located in the upper right quadrant of Figure 2. Once the 
area of wide exploration is determined through the organizational focusing process, 
subsequent areas of local exploration will remain primarily within this range. Therefore, 
areas of exploration are unlikely to change much even when the CEO is replaced. The 
direction of exploration will remain generally stable, and the exploration activities 
generally consistent.  
In contrast, Kodak paid little attention to the organizational focusing process. 
Rather, Kodak’s CEOs recruited from outside the company often decided on a specific 
area of exploration in a top–down manner without an organizational focusing process. 
Thus, Kodak’s exploration process can be located in the lower left quadrant of Figure 2. 
In such a company, areas of exploration tend to be influenced by investor demands 
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and/or the CEO's past business experiences. Traditionally, the different business 
experiences and achievements of CEOs invited from different business fields are 
considered strengths. However, Kodak’s case indicates that, when areas of exploration 
are decided in a top–down manner, a CEO’s varied experience may increase the risk 
that the exploration strategy will lose its focus (Miller and Ireland, 2005).  
   These findings indicate that the framework of exploration processes can 
effectively explain the differences in exploration processes between Fujifilm and Kodak. 
This comparison may contribute to greater understanding of corporate exploration 
processes. However, analyses of additional cases will be necessary to establish the 
effectiveness of the framework presented in this study.  
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